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Before: FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR. and ROTH, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  July 25, 2012 ) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
Lee J. Rohn, Esquire (argued) 
Lee J. Rohn & Associates  
1101 King Street  
Christiansted, VI 00820 
 Counsel for Appellant Lee Rohn 
 
David J. Cattie, Esquire (argued) 
Charles E. Engeman, Esquire 
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart  
1336 Beltjen Road  
Suite 201  
St. Thomas, VI 00802 
 Counsel for Appellees Sun Constructors, Richard 
Langner and Excel Group, Inc. 
  
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Attorney Lee Rohn appeals a decision of the District 
Court holding her in contempt, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
45(e), for failing to comply with a subpoena.  The subpoena 
was issued by Sun Constructors (“Sun”) as part of discovery 
in the motion Ms. Rohn filed, seeking the recusal of the 
District Judge in seven cases in which Ms. Rohn appeared as 
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counsel.  The cases, all of which were in different procedural 
postures, were consolidated for purposes of consideration of 
the recusal motion.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
conclude that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and 
will remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
 In the recusal motion, Ms. Rohn alleged that the 
District Judge‟s “personal animosity” towards her was 
creating an appearance of bias and prejudice against her 
clients.  (App. 104-05.)  In support of the recusal motion, Ms. 
Rohn submitted a declaration, relating her summary of the 
facts that formed the basis for her allegation of personal 
animosity.  In response to the recusal motion and attached 
declaration, Sun, who was a defendant in one of the seven 
consolidated cases, sought discovery.
1
  Specifically, Sun 
subpoenaed Ms. Rohn.
2
  The subpoena sought production of 
                                                 
1
 While defendants in some of the other six cases opposed the 
recusal motion, as well as engaged in discovery regarding that 
motion, only Sun‟s subpoena and the actions associated with 
it are under review at this time.  
2
 The subpoena was issued by Sun.  However, the subsequent 
litigation surrounding the subpoena involved Sun, Richard 
“Doc” Langner and Excel Group, Inc. (collectively, 
“Defendants”). 
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documents as well as scheduling her deposition.
3
   
 Ms. Rohn filed a mandamus petition in our Court 
seeking to have us act on various discovery matters, including 
vacating the order requiring her to appear for her deposition.  
The petition was denied, but our Court directed that all 
discovery be overseen by a Magistrate Judge, and not the 
District Judge about whom the recusal motion was focused.   
 According to Defendants, Ms. Rohn did not comply 
with the subpoena.  She appeared for her deposition, but did 
not produce any documents.  As a result, Defendants moved 
for contempt, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e).
4
  The 
Magistrate Judge granted the motion, held Ms. Rohn in 
contempt, and awarded attorney‟s fees to Defendants as the 
sanction for her contempt.  Citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(7), Ms. 
                                                 
3
  Also attached to the motion for recusal were statements 
from a variety of other people, including Ms. Rohn‟s clients 
and other individuals not involved in any litigation before the 
District Judge.  Defendants sought discovery regarding these 
persons as well, but those requests and their resolution are not 
before us.  
4
 Rule 45(e) provides that the court issuing the subpoena 
“may hold in contempt a person who, having been served, 
fails without adequate excuse to obey the subpoena. A 
nonparty‟s failure to obey must be excused if the subpoena 
purports to require the nonparty to attend or produce at a 
place outside the limits of Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii).” 
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Rohn appealed to the District Judge, who affirmed the finding 
of contempt without holding a hearing.  
 Ms. Rohn now argues on appeal that (1) the Magistrate 
Judge lacked the statutory authority to enter the contempt 
order and (2) the District Judge failed to conduct a de novo 
hearing, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(e).   
II.  Jurisdiction 
 In our order granting Ms. Rohn‟s emergency motion 
seeking to stay the payment of the attorney‟s fees, we directed 
the parties to address the issue of this Court‟s jurisdiction, 
specifically focusing on the “„congruence of interests‟ 
distinctions outlined in Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 
Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 199 and 211 (1999), and whether 
Appellant should be treated as a party for purposes of this 
appeal.”5   
 In Cunningham, the petitioner had served as counsel 
for the plaintiff in a civil rights action in federal court.  
                                                 
5
 The order also cited U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion 
Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988).  There, the 
Supreme Court held that nonparty witnesses could challenge 
a court‟s lack of subject matter jurisdiction when defending 
against a civil contempt action.  Reasoning that “[t]he right of 
a nonparty to appeal an adjudication of contempt cannot be 
questioned,” the Court extrapolated that this right 
encompassed the ability to challenge the court‟s jurisdiction. 
Id. at 76-77. 
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Petitioner flouted several discovery orders entered by the 
magistrate judge overseeing discovery, resulting in the 
magistrate judge imposing sanctions against counsel, pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.  The magistrate judge who imposed the 
discovery sanctions against counsel “took care to specify, 
however, that he had not held a contempt hearing and that 
petitioner was never found to be in contempt of court.”  
Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 201.   
 In justifying why immediate appeal should be 
available to her, the petitioner “posit[ed] that contempt orders 
imposed on witnesses who disobey discovery orders are 
immediately appealable and argue[d] that the sanctions order 
in this case should be treated no differently.”  Id. at 206.  The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]he effective 
congruence of interests between clients and attorneys 
counsels against treating attorneys like other nonparties for 
purposes of appeal.”  Id. at 207.  That is, “[u]nlike witnesses, 
whose interests may differ substantially from the parties‟ 
[interests], attorneys assume an ethical obligation to serve 
their clients‟ interests.”  Id. at 206.  The Supreme Court, in 
criticizing the petitioner‟s position, noted that her “argument 
also overlook[ed] the significant differences between a 
finding of contempt and a Rule 37(a) sanctions order.”  Id. at 
207.  That is, “„[c]ivil contempt is designed to force the 
contemnor to comply with an order of the court,‟ [while] a 
Rule 37(a) sanctions order lacks any prospective effect and is 
not designed to compel compliance.”  Id.  (quoting Willy v. 
Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 139 (1992)).  “[W]e have 
repeatedly held that a witness subject to a discovery order, but 
not held in contempt, generally may not appeal the order.”  
Id. at 204 n.4. 
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 The Third Circuit has also commented on the 
difference between orders entered pursuant to Rule 37(a) and 
contempt orders,
6
 as well as the impact of the “congruence of 
interests” between an attorney and client.  E. Maico Distrib., 
Inc. v. Maico-Fahrzeugfabrik, G.m.b.H., 658 F.2d 944, 949-
50 (3d Cir. 1981).  In E. Maico, we examined several orders, 
one of which imposed sanctions against defendant‟s counsel 
in response to a discovery dispute.  This Court concluded that 
the congruence of interests between the attorney and client 
was “so great that [counsel‟s] status as a non-party is 
arguable.”  Id. at 950.  That is, counsel‟s “interest in 
counseling the motion was nearly identical with [the client‟s] 
interest in making it and his interest can be vindicated 
following judgment as well as [the client‟s] can.”  Id. at 950-
51.   
                                                 
6
  We have distinguished between sanctions orders entered 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) and other discovery 
sanctions.  E. Maico Distrib., Inc. v. Maico-Fahrzeugfabrik, 
G.m.b.H., 658 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1981).  There, we stated that 
“[w]e note that other types of discovery sanctions against 
non-parties may be appealed immediately even when imposed 
against a party‟s attorney.  But those sanctions are unlike 
Rule 37(a) penalties in both purpose and effect, in ways 
directly relevant to the reasons for permitting an immediate 
appeal.  In civil contempt proceedings or Rule 37(b) sanctions 
against a non-party, even against an attorney to or an officer 
of a party, an appeal generally need not wait until final 
judgment in the case as a whole.”  Id. at 949. 
 
10 
 
 In light of the distinction drawn both by our Court and 
the Supreme Court between sanctions imposed pursuant to 
Rule 37 and a finding of contempt imposed pursuant to Rule 
45, the Magistrate Judge‟s action in holding Ms. Rohn in 
contempt pursuant to Rule 45 is significant regarding whether 
we have jurisdiction over this case.  Third Circuit law is clear 
— non-party witnesses who are held in contempt may 
immediately appeal the contempt order.  In re Flat Glass 
Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have 
held nonparty witnesses must be held in contempt before 
seeking appellate review.”).7   
 We must now determine whether Ms. Rohn should be 
treated as a party based on the congruence of her interest with 
the interests of her clients in bringing the recusal motion.  We 
conclude, based on the facts of this case, that Ms. Rohn was 
being subpoenaed as a witness, rather than in her capacity as 
counsel to the movants.  By submitting her declaration, along 
with letters she authored, personal travel information, and 
other personal information, unrelated to any of the cases 
pending before the District Judge, Ms. Rohn made herself a 
witness in the recusal matter.  She placed her credibility at 
issue.  The subpoena sought information related to these 
questions, which is unrelated to the merits of any of the seven 
cases in which the recusal motions were filed.   
                                                 
7
 Similarly, legal commentators have observed that “[f]inal 
contempt adjudications, imposing sanctions, are deemed 
appealable as final decisions in all situations other than that of 
civil contempt against a party to a pending proceeding.”  15B 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3917. 
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 In our view, Ms. Rohn was a nonparty witness when 
the Magistrate Judge held her in contempt for failing to 
comply with the requirements of the subpoena.  Based on this 
determination, we have jurisdiction to review the finding of 
contempt.
8
  
III.  Analysis 
 Defendants moved, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, to 
hold Ms. Rohn in contempt for failing to comply with the 
subpoena.  Acting upon this motion, the Magistrate Judge 
held Ms. Rohn in contempt.  Magistrate judges are granted 
contempt authority by statute.
9
  28 U.S.C. § 636(e).
10
  Citing 
                                                 
8
 Parenthetically, we note that our precedent in Lazy Oil Co. 
v. WITCO Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 585-87 (3d Cir. 1999),  
allows an additional basis to assert jurisdiction over this 
appeal, given the fact that the District Judge denied the 
recusal motion on September 8, 2011.  In Lazy Oil, we 
affirmed our prior precedent that authorized our jurisdiction 
in cases where a premature notice of appeal subsequently 
ripened into a valid notice of appeal when a final judgment 
was entered before our consideration of the case.  Id. at 585-
86.   
9
 We note that the contempt authority set forth in Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 45(e) does not expand a magistrate judge‟s authority to 
hold Ms. Rohn in contempt for failing to comply with the 
subpoena.  
10
 Section 636(e)(6) provides in pertinent part that upon 
commission of an act that constitutes civil contempt, where 
the magistrate judge is not sitting pursuant to the consent 
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),  
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28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(7),
 11
 Ms. Rohn appealed the Magistrate 
Judge‟s contempt finding to the District Judge, who, without 
holding a hearing, issued an order denying the appeal and 
affirming the order of contempt.   
 Though arising in a criminal, rather than civil context, 
the actions of the magistrate judge and district judge in 
Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888 (3d 
Cir. 1992) closely track the actions of the judges in the case 
before us.  In Taberer, we clarified the scope and extent of a 
                                                                                                             
the magistrate judge shall forthwith certify the 
facts to a district judge and may serve or cause 
to be served, upon any person whose behavior 
is brought into question under this paragraph, 
an order requiring such person to appear before 
a district judge upon a day certain to show 
cause why that person should not be adjudged 
in contempt by reason of the facts so certified. 
The district judge shall thereupon hear the 
evidence as to the act or conduct complained of 
and, if it is such as to warrant punishment, 
punish such person in the same manner and to 
the same extent as for a contempt committed 
before a district judge.  
28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(6).   
11
 Section 636(e)(7) provides that “[t]he appeal of an order of 
contempt under this subsection shall be made to the court of 
appeals in cases proceeding under subsection (c) of this 
section. The appeal of any other order of contempt issued 
under this section shall be made to the district court.”  
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magistrate judge‟s contempt authority.  We noted that “under 
the statute, the magistrate judge‟s certification of facts seems 
designed to serve the function of a charging instrument or 
pleading for a trial to be held before the district judge.”  Id. at 
903.  We further distinguished between the requirements of 
section 636(b)(1)(B) which authorizes magistrate judges to 
conduct hearings and “submit to [a district judge] proposed 
findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by 
[a district judge], of any motion excepted in subparagraph 
(A),” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and the certification 
procedure set forth in section 636(e)(6).   
 In addition to the difference in the procedure, we noted 
the different role the district judge plays in each of these 
situations.  With respect to section 636(b)(1)(B), a district 
judge makes a de novo determination, while under section 
636(e)(6), a district judge conducts a de novo hearing.  
Taberer, 954 F.2d at 904.  That is,  
[a] de novo determination requires the district 
judge to “consider the record which has been 
developed before the magistrate and make his 
own determination on the basis of that record, 
without being bound to adopt the findings and 
conclusions of the magistrate.”  In contrast, a de 
novo hearing entails a new proceeding at which 
the decision is based solely on the evidence 
freshly presented at the new proceeding. 
 
 Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1609, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6163 and 
citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-76 
(1980)). 
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 In the present case, concluding that Rule 45 authorized 
him to do so, the Magistrate Judge entered an order granting 
the motion seeking to hold Ms. Rohn in contempt.  The 
Magistrate Judge did not certify any facts to the District 
Judge, nor did the Magistrate Judge enter an order requiring 
Ms. Rohn to show cause before the District Judge why she 
should not be held in contempt.  Ms. Rohn appealed this 
finding to the District Court, citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(7).  
The District Judge then entered an order, without holding a 
hearing, affirming the Magistrate Judge‟s order.   
 This procedure by both the Magistrate Judge and 
District Judge clearly violated the procedural requirements set 
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(6).  First, the Magistrate Judge did 
not certify the facts to the District Judge.  Second, the District 
Judge did not hold a hearing.  Ms. Rohn‟s appeal, filed 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(7), did not change the 
procedural requirements of § 636(e)(6).  Although Ms. 
Rohn‟s § 636(e)(7) appeal may have also been filed in error 
procedurally, the first violation of § 636(e)(6) precedes her 
error and must be rectified.   
 The language of the statute makes it clear that appeals 
authorized by § 636(e)(7) are only available from contempt 
orders entered by a magistrate judge.  The instances where a 
magistrate judge may enter a contempt order are set forth in 
§ 636(e)(2), (3), and (4).  Specifically, § 636(e)(2) authorizes 
a magistrate judge “to punish summarily by fine or 
imprisonment, or both, such contempt of the authority of such 
magistrate judge constituting misbehavior of any person in 
the magistrate judge‟s presence so as to obstruct the 
administration of justice.”  Section 636(e)(3) extends this 
criminal contempt authority to include “any case in which a 
United States magistrate judge presides with the consent of 
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the parties under subsection (c) of this section, and in any 
misdemeanor case proceeding before a magistrate judge 
under section 3401 of title 18,” by granting the magistrate 
judge “the power to punish, by fine or imprisonment, or both, 
criminal contempt constituting disobedience or resistance to 
the magistrate judge‟s lawful writ, process, order, rule, 
decree, or command.”  Finally, § 636(e)(4) authorizes a 
magistrate judge to “exercise the civil contempt authority of 
the district court” in civil cases where the magistrate judge is 
presiding by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c) or in criminal cases where the magistrate judge is 
presiding pursuant to the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3401.   
 The facts adduced here do not fall within the ambit of 
§ 636(e)(2), (3), or (4).  Therefore, the Magistrate Judge‟s 
contempt order was invalid and the District Judge erred in 
affirming the order.   
 In 2000, subsequent to our decision in Taberer, 
Congress amended § 636(e).  The amendments to § 636(e), 
while expanding magistrate judges‟ contempt authority, did 
not impact the certification procedure we addressed in 
Taberer.  That procedure continues to be required in this case.  
The statute does not grant the Magistrate Judge the authority 
to enter a contempt order since the action complained of did 
not fall within the definitions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 
636(e)(2), (3), or (4).  Ms. Rohn‟s actions occurred outside of 
the Magistrate Judge‟s presence, and not in a proceeding 
where the Magistrate Judge was presiding with the consent of 
the parties pursuant to § 636(c).  Instead, the Magistrate 
Judge was overseeing pretrial proceedings, pursuant to § 
636(b)(1)(A).  Therefore, the Magistrate Judge should have 
certified the facts of the alleged contempt to the District 
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Judge, who in turn should have held a hearing to determine 
those facts.  
IV.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons set forth above, we find that we have 
jurisdiction to hear this case.  We will remand the case so that 
the Magistrate Judge and District Judge can proceed in 
accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(6).
12
   
                                                 
12
 Ms. Rohn urges us to reverse and remand with instructions 
that contempt is inappropriate based on the facts of the case.  
Neither the Magistrate Judge nor the District Judge found any 
facts with respect to Ms. Rohn‟s alleged contempt.  As such, 
there are no facts upon which we may base a decision.  We 
simply cannot say, based on the scant record, what the 
ultimate resolution of this matter could or should be.  We can 
only remand in order for the District Court to follow the 
certification procedure set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(6). 
